

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 181 850

HE 012 276

AUTHOR Premfors, Rune
TITLE Institutional Governance in Higher Education: Public Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Yale Higher Education Research Group Working Paper.
INSTITUTION Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. Inst. for Social and Policy Studies.
SPONS AGENCY Lilly Endowment, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.; Tri-Centennial Fund, Stockholm (Sweden).
REPORT NO YHERG-38
PUB DATE Dec 79
NOTE 48p.
AVAILABLE FROM Higher Education Research Group, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, 1732 Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Administrator Role; *College Administration; College Governing Councils; *Comparative Education; Decision Making; Federal Regulation; Foreign Countries; *Governance; Government Role; *Government School Relationship; Higher Education; *Institutional Autonomy; Policy Formation; *Public Policy; Student Role; Teacher Role; Trend Analysis
IDENTIFIERS *Europe; France; Sweden; United Kingdom



ABSTRACT

Major public policies for institutional governance in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom over the past two decades are reviewed, and factors that may account for differences in policy developments in the three countries are considered. In France and (although only recently) in Sweden, politics have aimed at increasing institutional autonomy in higher education. British universities are considerably more independent from central government than are their counterparts in either France or Sweden. It is suggested that both demands and policies directed at increasing participation and autonomy in higher education are manifestations of broad social and policy trends in these countries. The concept of political culture is proposed to aid in understanding the variable feasibility of comprehensive reform in the three countries. It is also suggested that the contents of policy proposals may be attributed at least partially to the variations in participation by specific interest groups in policy formulation. The diverse efforts in each country to evaluate and explain reform implementation regarding institutional governance are also examined. An attempt is made to show that the transformation of institutional governance has been linked both to the development of systems of higher education from elite to mass systems and with broad social and policy trends toward participation and decentralization. (SW)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED181850

HE 012 276



"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Robert M. ...
DRCS

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO-
DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM
THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN-
ATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS
STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT
OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP

*Institution for
Social and Policy Studies*

YALE UNIVERSITY

New Haven, Conn. 06520

INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: PUBLIC POLICY IN FRANCE
SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

by

Rune Premfors

YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP
WORKING PAPER

YERG-38

December 1979

Rune Premfors
Research Associate (1978-1979)
Higher Education Research Group

The research reported in this paper has been supported by funds from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Fund and the Lilly Endowment for the comparative study of academic organization and governance. Part II of the paper will be published in the forthcoming issue of the International Journal of Institutional Management in Higher Education.

In the interest of fullest possible circulation of information and ideas, the Higher Education Research Group reproduces and distributes these Working Papers at the request of the authors who are affiliated with the Group. The views expressed are those of the authors.

A list of the Working Papers of the Group may be obtained from the address below.

Higher Education Research Group
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
Yale University
1732 Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

During the last two decades virtually all systems of higher education in Western nations have experienced important changes in their mode of governance. Although variations have been considerable both as to scope and character of these changes, a few general trends may well be discerned. Perhaps the most often noted trend common to most countries has been a significant increase in the participation of earlier disenfranchised groups in the governance of institutions. The traditional "professors' university"¹ has been transformed so as to involve new groups such as non-professorial and junior staff as well as students in governance. And administrators at the level of institutions have become more numerous and more influential. In some systems even technical and service workers have come to share in decision-making, often through their unions. And unionization of other categories, including teachers and researchers, has become a feature with important implications for governance in many systems.

Another trend is frequently observed: a decrease in institutional autonomy due to increasing government control. A recent study of "patterns of authority in seven national systems of higher education" concludes:²

A review of the process of decision making in various policy areas over the past three decades demonstrates in almost every case a shift of power from lower to higher levels. The role of government, whether national or state, has become more important.

Several factors are suggested in the literature to have contributed to this development: the rapid expansion of higher education systems in the 1950s and 1960s -- but also the stagnation in the 1970s; student activism and unrest; generally increased ambitions on the part of welfare state governments to gauge higher education performance by social standards, etc.³

The decreasing institutional autonomy is most often characterized as universal or, at least, as being valid for Western, industrialized nations in general. Some writers have, however, argued that a reverse trend may

be observed in systems which were traditionally among the most centralized.⁴

In analyzing public policy developments in France, Sweden and the U.K. below we focus on these two dimensions of institutional governance: participation and autonomy. More specifically the aspect of participation which gets most attention is the public policies pursued with regard to the representation of various groups on the governing bodies of institutions. With respect to the second policy dimension, autonomy, the focus is on the relationship between higher education institutions as collective entities and governments -- central or local.⁵

The research reported here should be seen as part of a rapidly growing concern of contemporary political and social science: comparative public policy analysis. In brief this is the "cross-national study of how, why and to what effect government policies are developed."⁶ The simple scheme implied in the cited characterization is adhered to in the presentation below. In Part I an overview is first provided of policy developments in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom over the last two decades. Then follows an effort to identify some of the major determinants of public policy. In Part II we turn to problems of implementation and evaluation with regard to policies for institutional governance in higher education.

Part I: Policy Developments and Determinants

An Overview of Policy Developments

To begin with we provide a brief background sketch of the three systems before detailing policy developments from the early 1960s onwards. The French and Swedish systems of higher education have traditionally shown more affinity with each other from the point of view of governance than has either one of them with their U.K. counterpart. The two former were

in the 1950s among the most centralized in Western Europe. Although infringements had begun to be made by new groups, power still centered around close to omnipotent chairholders at the base and ministerial or agency bureaucrats at the top. As in all elite systems the most reputable professors played an important policy-making role at the center as well. In spite of the considerable formal powers of the central level in most important areas -- finance, admission, curricula, appointments, etc. -- few conflicts over policy occurred.

There were, of course, considerable differences between the French and Swedish systems. For example, it has been said that before 1968, "il n'existe pas d'universités en France."⁷ The statement refers to the fact that the 20-odd universities were formal organizations not nearly as potent as the facultés. The latter were in fact the constituent units of the system since anything resembling departments in the Anglo-Saxon or German tradition did not exist. In contrast with this, departments in Sweden were beginning to form an important organizational level in the early post-war years. Although the faculty loyalties were of some consequence in the Swedish system as well, the university level was considerably more important than in France. In general, the considerable "gerontocracy" of the French university system was not paralleled in Sweden. Incremental changes occurred, and participation by new groups did not meet quite the same resistance in Swedish universities.

In the British university system, by way of contrast, the central level was powerful only in matters of finance -- and even here its powers were slight in comparison with France and Sweden. The professorial oligarchy was even formally allowed to make central policy within the

framework of the University Grants Committee (UGC) where they constituted the overwhelming majority. As for participation at the level of institutions, universities had traditionally been open to lay influence in a manner only paralleled in the United States. It seems, however, to have declined considerably ever since the turn of the century while the position of academics was correspondingly strengthened. This occurred both through the growth in importance of senates relative to councils and by way of increased academic representation on councils.⁸

In the public sector of British higher education conditions were obviously more akin to those of the continental state systems. However, the parallel should not be overdrawn. Most institutions were owned and operated by the same local educational authorities which were responsible for schools at the primary and secondary levels. The characterization of the British educational system as "a national system locally administered" was largely valid for higher education institutions of the public sector as well. That is, their autonomy was originally and in principle not greater than that of schools. However, throughout the 1940s and 1950s the central level continuously recommended local education authorities to create separate governing bodies which "should be given all reasonable freedom of action in directing the affairs of the College," and on which should be representatives of industry, commerce, the professions, etc.⁹

Policy developments in Sweden

In the Swedish case there are three sets of public policies for institutional governance which stand out during the 1960s and 1970s. The first instance occurred in 1964 when the Riksdag adopted a number of important measures affecting university governance. The thrust of the

reform was the improvement of efficiency by means of a considerably strengthened bureaucracy. The basic idea was that academic and administrative matters could and should be kept apart. A new supreme governing body was created at the university level but its formal competence and duties were not drastically different from its forerunner. Its composition was affected by the reform of the faculty-level governing body to include fully tenured university lecturers as well as professors. The former category's lower status was, however, expressed by the fact that they could not take part in appointments of professors. The position of students was somewhat strengthened both at the middle level of universities and within departments. All in all, however, the 1964 reform only marginally questioned the prerogatives of the professors in university governance.¹⁰

The second round of policy-making in the area of institutional governance occurred in 1969. Formally, the measures taken -- known by the acronym "FNYS" in Sweden -- were launched as experiments. All layers of the university system were affected, from the governing board of the Chancellor's Office (i.e. the central agency) down to the individual departments. At all levels a broader set of interests would be allowed to participate. The supreme governing body of the universities was now to consist of representatives of all groups within the institution, including students, administrative staff and service workers. The latter categories were to be represented through their local unions. The exact composition was allowed to vary from one institution to the next. Although many departments opted to stay out of the experimental activity, the overall change in university governance was considerable. The overwhelming predominance of professors was replaced by a more diffused

distribution of power within institutions.¹¹

The third and last set of policies in the Swedish context during the period was implemented from 1977. A number of amalgamations of institutions took place according to the basic rule that all post-secondary education in the same location should form a higher education "unit," called university or högskola. The reform implied an explicit and rather far-reaching attempt to decentralize authority to a new regional level and to the level of institutions. Consequently, the governing bodies of the new institutions have been given more autonomy than the old university boards, particularly in matters of finance and curricula. As for the composition of the governing body, the following proportions apply in the case of a university board of 18 members:

- 6 representing the "public interest"
- 4 representing the "activity of the institution"
- 3 representing the trade unions
- 3 representing the students
- 1 rector
- 1 head of administration

The six members representing the "public interest" were to be appointed by the municipal and county councils where the institution was located. The "activity of the institution" stands for teaching and research.

Policy-developments in France

In the French context there is, of course, one instance of public policymaking for institutional governance which is of overriding importance. The loi d'orientation adopted by the French parliament in November 1968 completely restructured the university system. The universities became genuine institutions with power to decide for themselves in many areas and with a system of governance which allowed all groups to participate.

The two principles of autonomy and participation were together with pluridisciplinarity advanced as the pillars of the reform. In the law autonomy and participation are explicitly seen as closely inter-dependent: participation is viewed as more or less meaningless without autonomy. The one is a means towards the achievement of the other. Furthermore, the concept of autonomy is seen as multidimensional. Three main areas are identified: administrative, financial and pedagogical autonomy.¹² Inevitably, the text of the law reveals the limits of that autonomy. (And as we shall demonstrate below, the real changes have been quite limited.)

With regard to the principle of participation, the Orientation Law also set definite limits to its application. It used both techniques which come most easily to mind: first, some matters were not within the authority of the body with the widest representation of interests; second, some categories within the university were better represented than others on governing bodies. The supreme governing body, the conseil d'université, was to be a large body (at most 80 members) composed of all groups within the university and, in addition, external persons "choisies en raison de leur compétence et notamment de leur rôle dans l'activité régionale" (Article 13). The share of these regional representatives could vary from one-sixth to one-third of the total. The senior teachers should always be at least equal in number to the students and, furthermore, always make up at least 60 percent of the total number of teachers. In the case of students, a quorum rule stated that if less than 60 percent participated in elections for the governing body, their representation would be proportionally reduced.

Policy developments in the United Kingdom

An introductory, and important, observation about policy developments in the U.K. is that at no time and in no sector have measures been taken

which in scope resemble those of France in 1968 or of Sweden in 1977. Even the Swedish reforms of 1964 seem comprehensive in comparison. And, of course, with regard to the British university sector extensive reform legislation would imply a revolution in the relations between the state and the institutions. In order to guide the universities in matters of governance the Privy Council created a Model Charter in 1962, and this "was the closest the British have come to anything remotely resembling the comprehensive legislation on university structure that has been enacted in France, Sweden and Germany."¹³ The role of the Council has generally been to confirm, in a reactive fashion, trends which have already been established by actions of the individual universities. In this way developments toward increased academic self-governance, a more prominent role for non-professorial staff, and student participation have all been supported by the Privy Council.¹⁴ Typically, instead of being regulated by legislation the basic principles of student participation in university governance were set out in an agreement between the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals and the National Union of Students in 1968.¹⁵

With regard to institutional autonomy in the university sector it has been repeatedly and quite convincingly argued that a number of fairly small infringements have added up to an increased influence on the part of central government over university affairs in the 1960s and 1970s. In particular this is said to be due to the changing role of the UGC. From having functioned as a buffer between universities and the state, the UGC has turned into an arm of central government, resembling any other government department.¹⁶ Although this generalization has a ring of

of truth in it, there should be no doubt about the fact that university autonomy is still much greater in the U.K. than in either post-1968 France or post-1977 Sweden.

Public policies for institutional governance could, of course, be expected to be more dirigiste in the public sector. And, indeed, they have been, although it should be remembered that central ambitions to intervene are considerably tempered by the position of local authorities. Only in one instance has Parliament adopted legislation affecting institutional governance during the period. The Education (No. 2) Act 1968 created the legal framework for reforms in line with the so-called Weaver Report of two years earlier. In brief terms that report had proposed that local authorities should set up both separate governing bodies for their colleges, and special academic boards within institutions ("academic affairs of a college are primarily for academic people to deal with").¹⁷

Two further instances of policy-making in the public sector should be mentioned. In 1967 the Department of Education and Science (DES) issued so-called Notes for Guidance concerning the governance of the new polytechnics. The governing body should include: representatives of the local authority; "strong representation" of industry and commerce; the Director and other members of the staff; and external personalities with relevant experience.¹⁸

Further, in 1970 the DES issued Circular 7/70 which contained modified and more detailed versions of the Weaver recommendations. In comparison with the Notes, the Circular was more detailed with regard to the proportions of various interests on the governing body, and it also suggested that provisions be made for student representation.¹⁹ Representatives of the local authority should make up less than half of the members of

the governing body -- normally one-third would suffice; about one-third should be representatives of industry and commerce; other educational establishments should also be represented; from within the institution, the Principal and not fewer than two other teachers should sit on the governing body, and students ought to be considered in colleges with a substantial proportion of students over eighteen; finally, it was recommended that there should be room for people who could make a contribution in a purely personal capacity.²⁰

This section has provided an overview of the timing, forms, and contents of major public policies for institutional governance in France, Sweden and the U.K. In France and (although only recently) in Sweden, policies have aimed at increasing institutional autonomy in higher education. While France departed more radically from inherited policy in the university sector, Sweden included all post-secondary education in its more modest effort at decentralization of decision-making authority. In the U.K. the universities have lost some of their heralded autonomy through a series of small measures taken by central government and the UGC. Undoubtedly, however, British universities are still considerably more independent from central government than are their counterparts in either France or Sweden. With regard to public sector institutions in the U.K. central policy has aimed at loosening the grip of local authorities over the academic life. The ideal has obviously been a system of governance resembling that of the university sector. A further significant step in this direction would be taken if, as was recently proposed by a governmental commission, a "UGC for the public sector" was to be created.²¹

All three countries examined here have been shown to be in conformity with the trend towards increasing participation in governance by earlier

disenfranchised groups. In France and Sweden where layman participation has traditionally been weak -- particularly in the university sector -- public policies have aimed at increasing their role on governing bodies of institutions. In both countries they now occupy a sizeable minority of seats. In British universities layman representation has traditionally been strong, but their influence has been decreasing in favor of academic self-government. In the public sector, central policy has tried to diminish the role of local authority representatives while enhancing that of representatives from industry, commerce, etc. In all three countries non-professorial staff has had their position strengthened on governing bodies. Perhaps most significantly, however, students have now achieved a legitimate role in institutional governance in all three countries. France and Sweden have been most explicit in their recognition of students' claims to participate, while students in the U.K. play a less significant role in governance. Only in the Swedish case are representatives of the student body permitted to take part in all decisions which are finally taken at the institution level. By way of contrast, decisions concerning research and appointments are largely outside the scope of student influence in French universities. In all three countries trade unions and employers' organizations have been recognized as having a legitimate interest in the governance of higher education. Sweden obviously stands out with regard to the role played by labor market organizations: they have been accorded formal representation at all levels of the higher education system. In practice, however, unions seem to be as important in France as in Sweden at the level of institutions.

Policy Determinants

Why have public policies for institutional governance developed as described in the foregoing section? What factors may account for differ-

ences in policy developments in France, Sweden and the U.K.? To begin to answer questions of this kind we will consider three sets of factors. First, we examine the proposition that policies were determined by broad social, cultural and political forces affecting many other sectors besides higher education. Then we investigate the explanatory power of the different national "political cultures" of higher education. Finally, we analyze some aspects of the political processes which engendered government policies in the area.

Participation and autonomy as social and policy trends

It is a commonplace to observe that demands for participation and autonomy have swept the Western world during the 1960s and 1970s. In almost every walk of life the legitimacy of established authorities has been questioned. Whether as voters, consumers or producers, large numbers of people have expressed dissatisfaction with public and private organizations. The indicators are many and varied: party loyalties have declined significantly in many countries; public opinion polls show increasing mistrust in politicians; cause groups have proliferated; and clients and consumers of various public services have demanded a say in the setting of standards. Certainly, all these and many more indicators may be observed in France, Sweden and the U.K.

And the political and administrative authorities in these countries have responded. The sociocultural trend has been translated into a policy trend. Authorities may have responded without conviction or only because they have been forced to or found it tactically sound. Still many policy measures in a large number of areas are now aimed at increasing participation and autonomy. Although sometimes by fits and starts, policies for industrial democracy, for example, are making progress as are policies aimed at decentralizing decision-making power to regional

and local levels. And every new major policy or policy change requires much more extensive consultation with affected groups and individuals before it can be adopted and implemented.

At a general level, then, we argue that policy developments in higher education are a manifestation of a much more widespread phenomenon. As has been pointed out, however, it was an early manifestation. Why was higher education a pioneering sector? At least three circumstances may be advanced as contributing factors. First, the chief clients of higher education are the students. Without entering into a detailed argument we may note that they are generally in a very favored position from which to articulate demands for participation and autonomy. And, again without entering into details, in the 1960s a number of circumstances incited them to articulate such demands.

Second, to some extent participation and autonomy traditionally characterized higher education institutions. This was true even for France and Sweden. University governance was characterized by collegial forms of decision-making, a form of democracy among the privileged, i.e. the professors. And although both systems were highly centralized in a comparative perspective, there should be no doubt about the fact that higher education in France and Sweden was seen to require, due to its special missions, an autonomous status not accorded other public sectors. The argument here is that because these properties were present to some extent, higher education has been particularly susceptible to both demands and policies for more participation and autonomy.²³

Third, and finally, the exploding growth of the higher education sector in the 1960s incited two partly contradictory policy trends. For one thing it increased the importance of the sector in political terms

since it consumed rapidly growing public resources and also affected an increasing number of people. Central policy-makers began to judge this earlier almost inconsequential sector according to their usual political standards. And the central bureaucratic staff grew rapidly. In the process institutions may have lost some of their traditional autonomy. For another thing, however, policy-makers in the centralized systems of France and Sweden began to realize that decentralization of decision-making power, apart from being demanded by large portions of academia, was also becoming necessary to prevent overload and promote efficiency. This is particularly evident in the case of Sweden where a very cautious effort at decentralization began already in the late 1960s. The chief motive seems initially to have been practicality. Successively, however, measures were increasingly being motivated in ideological terms: decentralization became an important end in itself.

Political culture

What may be termed the political culture of higher education has been defined as "a set of operative norms, ideals and characteristics which define the limits of legitimate government action."²³ The differences in this respect between France, Sweden and the U.K. have been considerable and may, we argue, further explain differences in policies for institutional governance.

Most significantly, such norms largely determined the political feasibility of comprehensive reform of institutional governance. At least two essential elements of the political culture which distinguish the U.K. from France and Sweden are relevant here. First, as Halsey & Trow have demonstrated in detail, "political autonomy" is a basic aspect

of the "English idea of a university." This norm prohibits comprehensive government actions vis-à-vis the universities. The legitimate mechanism for dealing collectively with the universities is the UGC.²⁴ In the public sector central government intervention has obviously been viewed as more legitimate. However, the claims of local authorities for influence have been equally legitimate and have acted as important constraints on central government.²⁵

In Sweden and France the scope of legitimate government intervention was much wider during the period. However, a second element of the political culture of higher education was important as well. This was the norm of administrative equality. In both countries it was inconceivable to reform structures of governance in one university and not in others: uniformity was required.²⁶

Political processes

Essentially three sets of questions are asked about the political processes. In what way did institutional governance become part of the political agenda? Where and by whom were detailed policy proposals formulated? What were the characteristics of the coalition-building necessary before policy adoption?

Agenda-setting

Both the 1964 and 1977 reforms of institutional governance in Sweden were part of much larger reform efforts. Two ad hoc commissions, known by the acronyms U55 and U68 respectively (where the number stands for the year of appointment), had been given the task to investigate, inter alia, problems of governance. In these cases the problem of agenda-setting must, then, be seen against the background of that wide-spread device in Swedish public policy-making, the ad hoc commission which works

for several years and covers a large number of policy problems in a sector. In higher education these commissions took on a cyclical character in the postwar years. U55 and U68 were appointed largely because the time was considered ripe for another commission.²⁷ It should be noted that the U68 commission was appointed before any dramatic signs of student unrest had occurred in Sweden in the spring of 1968. In sum, then, the exact timing of the 1964 and 1977 reforms was determined by the internal work of the commissions.²⁸

By way of contrast, the 1969 reform in Sweden and, of course, the 1968 loi d'orientation in France were certainly directly prompted by student unrest. Following the very minor student revolt in Sweden in the Spring of 1968, the Chancellor of the Universities proposed to the Cabinet that a committee be appointed to oversee experiments in university governance. Within a month the permission was given and preparations for the "FNYS" activities could begin. A reasonable proposition is that if student unrest had not triggered off these activities, comprehensive reforms of university governance would have had to await proposals from U68.

In France the government committed itself in public to sweeping university reforms already on May 23. It was realized that quick action was needed if a reform law was at all to serve as "une loi d'apaisement."

In the U.K. the picture is, as could be expected, less clear. For example, the responses to student demands and unrest were many and diffuse. However there should be no doubt that student participation was added as a new dimension to the more narrow and continuous policy deliberations of the British context from the late 1960s.²⁹ The other events we pointed to

above--the Weaver committee, the Education (No. 2) Act, the 1967 Notes for Guidance, and Circular 7/70-- were all part of the unfolding so-called binary policy embarked upon from 1965 onwards.³⁰

Policy formulation. Two of three instances of policy-making in Sweden were, then, characterized by the fact that the drawing up of detailed proposals occurred within the setting of ad hoc commissions with extremely broad terms of reference. U55 covered the entire university sector while U68 investigated all post-secondary education apart from post-graduate training. Their composition differed in an interesting manner indicative of a general trend in public policy-making in higher education. The U55 commission had as members professors and bureaucrats whereas U68 had a core group of four top-level bureaucrats surrounded by three reference groups, consisting of respectively politicians, representatives of labor market organizations, and people representing educational institutions, including students. The composition of the much more specialized committee which prepared the "FNYS" proposals reflects the same development. In particular it included both students and the labor market organizations. These were now beginning to be regarded by policy makers as legitimate interest groups at all levels of decision-making in higher education. The 1977 reforms were the outcome of an unusually elaborate process. Following the U68 report, a working party composed the MPs drew up a compromise proposal on the basis of which a framework bill was written and submitted to the Riksdag for approval in 1975. That granted, a further committee structure was set up to work on details. On the basis of its proposals a new and final government bill was put to the Swedish parliament in 1977.³¹

The formulation of policy in France in 1968 has been well documented.³² A first phase started with the appointment of eight chargés de mission whose

task was to collect the ideas for university reform already existing. The chief architect of the 1968 reform, Edgar Faure, has pointed to the crucial importance of this initial phase: "(T)hey condensed it all into a workable dossier which was my first document. The elaboration of the law owes them much".³³ During the next phase the Ministry consulted an extremely wide set of interests. Following this intense concertation, however, the actual drafting of the law occurred in relative secrecy due to the pressure of time but also for tactical reasons. To survey the work the "technostructure" (Faure's own term for the representatives of other government department) set up a committee with some 40 members. By contrast external interest groups could not get hold of a draft of the law until mid-September, i.e. only two weeks before the National Assembly gave its approval.

Policy formulation in the U.K. seems to have been relatively less open to influence from external interest groups. This does in no way mean that they were totally excluded. For example, the Weaver Study Group had apart from its chairman 20 members representing various facets of teacher education (including four union representatives).³⁴ It may be noted, however, that the "Weaver Committee, which was so influential on teacher representation and autonomy, neither included representatives of students nor took evidence from them".³⁵

Neither the Notes for Guidance of 1967 nor Circular 7/70 were formulated by committees with representation by external interests. Both documents were drawn up, however, following extensive consultation with such interests. In line with the British style of policy making in education these consultation procedures were undertaken in relative secrecy. At this stage, as Kogan has shown in some detail, typically only "legitimized" interest groups are participating with an understanding that what they learn is not quite yet for public consumption.³⁶

Policy adoption. Public policies are by definition adopted by public authorities of some kind or other. Here we are not interested in the formal decision as such, but rather, in the coalition-building processes which made their adoption possible.

The 1964 reforms in Sweden were almost unanimously supported in the Riksdag. The proposals from U55 had been regarded as largely non-controversial. The scattered voices which argued that the reforms would imply a very extensive bureaucratization of the university organization did not incite any widespread following at the time.

The 1969 reforms, by way of contrast, were adopted in a situation where some aspects of higher education policy had become politically controversial. Many representatives of academia were suspicious towards the "FNYS" experiments including a large number of professors and most of the radical students. But almost all other interests seem to have supported the reforms. The most crucial phase of the coalition-building process had occurred relatively early. What had clearly started out as an effort to appease the protesting students turned successively into a reform of university governance which implied the participation of all groups involved in higher education. The fact that the labor market organizations were involved in the process from the start was both an expression of and an additional contribution to this evolving doctrine.

The 1977 reforms in Sweden are of considerable interest from the point of view of coalition-building. Their adoption was in serious jeopardy and could only be secured following important concessions. The complicated story can only be briefly outlined here. Following the 1973 elections, the Social Democratic government could only muster half the voting strength of the Riksdag including the Communist votes. In order to have a reform based on the U68 proposals adopted, the Social Democrats were, in other words, forced to

acquire the support of one or more of the non-socialist parties of the opposition. However, all of these were extremely reluctant about the merits of the U68 proposals, as were large and vocal parts of academia. During a short period the Social Democratic government was on the verge of burying the U68 report but decided finally to make the necessary concession to gain the support of the Center Party of the opposition. The catalyst in this process was the idea of a new regional level in higher education, a proposal which fitted extremely well with the Center Party's ideology of decentralization and regional development. The most disputed single aspect of the entire U68 report had been the composition of the governing bodies of institutions. The commission had suggested that "public representatives" should have a majority of the seats. Now, with the introduction of a regional level, the government could make an orderly retreat from that proposal by giving one-third of the seats on the institutional boards to "public representatives" while they were given a two-thirds majority on the new regional boards.

In the Riksdag decision of May 1975 the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party only differed in details. When, in 1976, the three non-socialist parties won the general election and formed a coalition government the considerable differences between them in the area of higher education policy remained and caused much tension. Due to a combination of factors (internal tensions, bureaucratic inertia, a change of policy leadership within the Liberal Party) the new government largely continued the higher education policy of its predecessor. In the area of institutional governance virtually nothing was changed from the 1975 compromise between the Social Democrats and the Center Party. While probably a majority among Liberals and Conservatives were lukewarm at best vis-à-vis the reform, only the Communists voted against it in the Riksdag in April of 1977.

Early in the process of coalition-building in France, Edgar Faure had realized that his task during the ensuing months would be to manoeuvre so as to win at least the tacit approval of the "technostructure" on one hand and a majority among the Gaullists on the other, and to do it without too many concessions. The necessary retreats made at various stages turned out to be considerable, especially before the draft law could pass the Council of Ministers. Only through the explicit support of the President himself could Faure manage fairly well on this stage. All in all, however, the adoption of the proposal by the Council required modifications which made it "significantly less 'participationniste'".³⁷ And this watering down continued in the National Assembly where amendments considerably widened the area of university affairs which was to be the reserve of senior teachers and researchers. Further, layman representation on the University Council was now made compulsory. In sum, the parliament voted a less radical loi d'orientation with regard to both participation and autonomy than had been outlined in the first draft by Edgar Faure and his collaborators and which in turn owed much to the proposals and practical demonstrations of teachers and students during the Spring events. Very few among the members were probably enthusiastic but only the Communists and six Gaullists abstained in the key vote of the National Assembly.

The differences between the political parties in the area of higher education have always been slight in the United Kingdom. This generalization certainly includes policies for institutional governance and, in contrast with the other two countries, the post-1968 period as well. The function of coalition-building is of greater interest with regard to the relations between the center (DES, UGC, Parliament) and the institutions and, in the case of the public sector, the local authorities. For example, the doctrine that institutions of the public sector should largely imitate the universities in their system of

governance was early established with the DES which subsequently has pressed for its adoption largely against the will of the local authorities but in coalition with teachers and other representatives of the institutions.

* * * * *

In this section we have made an effort to depict the major determinants of public policy developments in the area of institutional governance. First of all we argued that, basically, both demands and policies aiming at increased participation and autonomy in higher education are manifestations of broad social and policy trends in these countries. The pioneering role of the sector in this regard can largely be explained with reference to the position of students generally and to their specific situation in the 1960s in particular; to the fact that participation and autonomy to some extent were already heralded concepts in higher education governance; and to the particular impact of rapid growth in the 1960s which first stressed the role of central authorities but which increasingly, at least in the centralized systems, have promoted policies of decentralization.

Second, we found the concept of political culture useful in understanding the variable feasibility of comprehensive reform in the three countries. The specific notion of university autonomy in the U.K., and its widespread support, prevented any attempt of system-wide reform. By contrast, the legitimacy of central intervention in both France and Sweden plus the notion of administrative equality strongly prevalent in both countries largely ruled out any other kind of reform.

Finally, we tried to add to our list of policy determinants by examining in some detail the relevant political processes. With regard to the function of agenda-setting it was found that while two of three processes in Sweden started by means of a fairly routinized policy-planning procedure where the

exact timing of reforms were determined by internal mechanisms, the third process under scrutiny ("FNYS") must, as must the 1968 reform in France, be regarded as a government response to student unrest. In a more diffuse way, student protests in the U.K. were effective in putting their demands on the political agenda as well but did not instigate any distinct reform process at the central level.

Further, the analysis of policy formulation showed a varied role for different interests. In Sweden there was a development from a pattern where bureaucrats and professors dominated to one which involved a very broad set of participants, including students and labor market organization. The French case was obviously very atypical of public policy-making in the Fifth Republic in its very broad concertation of external interest groups while policy formulation in the U.K. with regard to institutional governance seems to conform well to a typical pattern of relatively intense but rather secretive consultation of legitimized interest groups.

At least partially, then, the contents of policy proposals may be attributed to the variations in participation by specific interest groups in policy formulation. However, the coalition-building processes necessary for adoption seem to have been more crucial in determining the final policy contents. In the 1969 process in Sweden, for example, we observed how the increasing influence of labor market organizations was used to produce a reform which, although prompted by student demands, ended up as more of an example of "industrial democracy". In the process leading up to the 1977 reforms the vehement protests of large portions of academia against the original U68 proposals as well as the need for the Social Democrats and the central bureaucrats to win the support of the Center Party contribute generally to the increasing importance given to the dimension of autonomy. With regard to the 1968 reform process in France it was shown how

coalition-building successively emptied the proposal which had resulted from the unusually open policy formulation process of much of its radical contents with regard to both autonomy and participation. In Part II of this paper we will deal much more fully with problems of implementing government policies for institutional governance.

Part II: Policy Implementation and Evaluation

In Part I of this paper we provided an overview of the timing, forms and contents of major public policies for institutional governance in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the last few decades. Furthermore, we made an effort to depict the major determinants of public policy developments in the area. In this second part we turn to a discussion of implementation and evaluation. Before hopes are running too high, however, it should be pointed out that ours is a very preliminary attempt to analyze these aspects of higher education policy in a comparative fashion. Essentially what is accomplished in the sequel is a summary and an interpretation of the diverse efforts in each country to evaluate and explain reform implementation.

Policy Implementation in France

The university reform in 1968 in France has generated a quite extensive body of works of an evaluative nature during the ensuing decade. The 10th anniversary of the May events in 1978 recently added substantially to this literature. The continued interest in the reform probably stems from several circumstances: the reform implied a radical policy departure; the reform was, and still is, very controversial; the basic principles of the reform were explicitly and coherently stated. Furthermore, some specific properties

of the reform made it amenable to analysis. A prime example is the design of the electoral system in the new universities--which has incited its own psephology. Below we first outline the process of implementation before discussing the extent to which the policy objectives of autonomy and participation have been realized in the French context.

The mise en place of the new French universities may be said to have occurred in four major phases.³⁸ First, there was the formation of the UERs, the new departments. The deadline had been set at December 31, 1968. By that date nearly 600 had been formed in a very hectic process. This was at all possible only through the fact that a large share of them simply turned out to be renamed faculties. During a second phase, between January and April of 1969, most UERs held elections. The turnout was high despite a boycott by the extreme Left. The third step in the process implied the designation of the new universities and a screening on the part of central government of their statutes. The process has been characterized as "almost anarchic"³⁹ and the deadline was postponed over and over again. Finally a ministerial ultimatum created the thirteen Paris universities in March 1970. A last phase involved the creation of the CNESER, the representative advisory council at the national level. The inaugural session of that body on May 14, 1971, signified that the establishment of the new structures was completed.

The process of establishing the new French universities was intensely political throughout. The lack of consensus in the interpretation of the Orientation Law slowed down the process of change. The Ministry knew very well that many UERs and universities were forming on the basis of friendships and political affinities. However, in most cases the central authority honored these arrangements; only in a few instances did it resort to force -- then grouping UERs in such a fashion as to assure a non-radical majority in the

institution as a whole.⁴⁰ Furthermore, both the internal university elections and the first elections to CNESER illustrated the intense politicization of many institutions, as did occasional outbursts of student unrest.

The new Minister of Education who had replaced Faure in June 1969, Olivier Guichard, and his collaborators, as well as the new president, George Pompidou, were obviously less enthusiastic about the basic principles of the Orientation Law than their predecessors. The new leadership used every opportunity to interpret the Law's provisions in a conservative fashion.⁴¹ The prolonged character of the process of establishment of the new structures was largely caused by the needs of the Ministry to manipulate with the tools available.

Undoubtedly, these tools were less sharp than in the pre-reform days. The principles of the university reform "foreclosed any recourse to 'authoritarian' decision-making methods" in the old style.⁴² As it turned out the variation in the specific provisions of university statutes was considerable. The Ministry had created a special committee (known as the "Gazier commission") to survey the elaboration of statutes. Although this committee certainly did not strictly limit its comments to the legality of proposals, the end result was a set of statutes which fully utilized the room given by central provisions. In the area of elections, for example, the number of seats, duration of mandate periods and campaigns, composition of electoral colleges, modes of election, eligibility rules, etc., differed greatly between universities.⁴³ For another example, when applying the provision that Councils should appoint between one-sixth and one-third of regional representatives, almost all universities adopted the lower proportion; some even submitted statutes with less than that proportion -- but these were of course not accepted by the Ministry.

In sum, then, the three years required to establish the new university system were characterized by political conflict within institutions, a conservative interpretation of many of the provisions of the 1968 Orientation Law, and a beginning resurgence of central control over some aspects of university life -- but no effort was made to repeal any basic part of the Law itself.

If we extend our perspective to cover the entire post-1968 period, how have the goals of participation and autonomy fared in the reformed French university system? As could be expected opinions vary greatly on these issues, even in purportedly scholarly evaluations. Below we first briefly consider participation, then autonomy.

Participation. This policy dimension has been the focus of attention of central higher education policy since 1968. Both in the Orientation Law and in the Ministry's texts of application participation was extensively regulated. In 1975 the Law was even amended by the French parliament in this regard: the essential change was a lowering of the quorum rate for student representation from 60 to 50 percent, but amendments concerning eligibility, terms of office, etc., were also carried.⁴⁴ Most of the regulation has undoubtedly served to guarantee equity for all participants -- all in a well-established French tradition -- but another motive force has been to limit the influence of extremist students. Only the students have a quorum rule for their elections; this but also many other specific arrangements clearly make them into a sort of électeurs mineurs.⁴⁵

The quorum rule might have been considered a safeguard against extreme situations but in practice it reduced student representation significantly in all but a very small number of institutions. In the first elections in 1969, about 52 percent of the students voted despite the call for a boycott

by the extreme Left. In the ensuing years, however, the percentage voting fell drastically as the following figures show:

1970-71:	31,2	1973-74:	24,2
1971-72:	27,4	1974-75:	25,2
1972-73:	25,0	1975-76:	28,0

Studies have shown that the voting rate varies according to location, discipline, level of study and size of institutions.⁴⁶ Small institutions outside Paris with a large share of their students in professional programs reach higher levels of student voting. Third-cycle students vote more than second-cycle students who vote more than first-cycle students.

How should these figures be interpreted? Most commentators of course agree that they point to a widespread apathy among students. However, it is often remarked that in "comparable elections" the voting rate is similar.⁴⁷ And, furthermore, the record of other categories in the universities is sometimes quite feeble as well. The information on voting rates for these groups are scarce but an examination of their participation in the work of the Councils shows that students are not too far behind teachers and administrative personnel in their manifested interest, and that they have shown more interest than the external representatives.⁴⁸

If there are differences in the interpretation of the students' voting rate, there is an even wider spread in the explanations of this relative apathy. Conservatives mobilize their traditional argument that students have a too limited stake in and knowledge of university affairs to be motivated (and allowed) to participate. They also add that the extremist politics of some students (and teachers) have scared off many "average" students. Student leaders and their supporters in academia, argue, by way of contrast, that the low participation rates must be understood in terms of a government policy which has discouraged such participation. They also point to the limited

influence of students on university governance, both since institutional autonomy is too limited and because power within the university lies elsewhere than in the Council. Power in the new system is concentrated in the Ministry at the central level and in the university president and a growing bureaucracy at the local level.⁴⁹

Both opponents and proponents of student participation would probably agree that another factor partly explains student apathy: the increasingly bleak labor market prospects which for a large number of students have changed their relations to the institutions.

Autonomy. As was mentioned above, the Orientation Law identified three functional categories of autonomy: administrative, pedagogical and financial. What is termed administrative autonomy may largely be equated with the non-regulated aspects of participation. As we have already shown, central policy allowed considerable variation in university statutes to begin with, but we also noted that some aspects, in particular matters relating to student participation, have been increasingly regulated.

Pedagogical autonomy refers to the traditional concepts of Lehrfreiheit and Lehrnfreiheit, constituting the core of university autonomy. In this regard the Orientation Law and the subsequent ministerial decrees meant relatively little change. University teachers are still civil servants with the rights and obligations of that breed. Students are still admitted according to externally regulated criteria, not by a decision of the individual institution. And the dominating part of university curricula still takes the form of national diploma. The Orientation Law's provision for specific university diplomas has not been successful: teachers and students alike have defended the nationally regulated diploma for fear of a decreasing market value of their education. Although the evidence is scarce it should at the same time be noted that the

national diploma in practice seems to mean less than in the pre-1968 universities; the variation in curricula seems greater between institutions.

The perhaps most important gain of the 1968 reform in the area of financial autonomy was the provision that the university finances would be subject only to a posteriori control. Very little else was said in the Law. What soon emerged was a system which was at least formally less efficient in regulating university budgets in detail, and which relied on such crude criteria as student numbers and square meters of buildings and grounds in determining the allocation of grants. Much criticism was levelled against the system, as often prompted by the austerity measures taken by the government as by any shortcoming of the budget system per se. (It is probably true, however, that in some instances austerity measures have been used selectively in a manner which appears to be politically motivated). In the last few years, inter alia as a result of the work of a special commission, the budget process has been modified in an effort to implement the provision of the Orientation Law which states that allocations should be granted according to the types and quality of programs offered by institutions.⁵⁰ Obviously such considerations, even if desirable from other points of view, do not further institutional autonomy.

The best overall assessment of the institutional autonomy in the new French university system is probably that of Ronald Brickman.⁵¹ In brief summary he argues that the old facultés could exercise more autonomy in many areas than has generally been recognized.⁵² The largest share of the autonomy of the new universities represents a direct heritage from the faculties. Where new powers have been invested in the universities, they often concern areas where the institutions before 1968 had a considerable influence -- but formally only in an advisory capacity. Furthermore, and this is an observation of

general significance, the universities gained decision-making power without a corresponding loss on the part of central government:⁵³

The introduction of new tasks, the activation of old ones, the integration of formerly separate institutions into a single governing framework, the increase in decision-making units, and an increased interdependence and politicization within the local community -- all these have enhanced the governing activity of the new universities without substantially diminishing the powers of the national administration. (...)

Viewed as a whole, the net impact of the French university reform appears to have led to more profound changes within the local university community itself than to a fundamental alteration in the distribution of authority between central and local levels.

Our view largely coincides with that of Brickman -- if anything we are slightly more optimistic about the actual extent of decentralization; for example, we think there is a tendency to confound central government activity with central government power -- a misperception which leads some observers to underestimate the leeway of institutions.

An explanation of this relative non-implementation of the reform goal of autonomy would have to consider a range of complex factors. Here we shall only briefly point to the most pertinent ones. A list of relevant factors would certainly have to include both some basic flaws in the "policy theory" of the Orientation Law and circumstances related to the process of implementation. In the first vein, it seems evident that the law excluded too many critical variables: we have mentioned the civil service status of teachers, the selection of students, and we may add that important parts of university administration (various kinds of service, libraries, etc.) remained the responsibility of other central government hierarchies. In other instances the provisions were not politically feasible. An example would be the national diploma: nothing short of a firm suppression of it could realistically have paved the way for the new university diploma. A majority of both Left and Right, within academia as well as outside, was in practice against a significantly

reduced role for centrally regulated curricula.

As shown earlier, the politics of implementation was characterized by a high level of conflict and an increasingly conservative interpretation of the Orientation Law. In the case of autonomy this implied that the government was clearly intent to keep control over politically sensitive areas of university developments. Brickman has shown that it is precisely this which characterizes government action in the 1970s; hence the efforts to regulate the internal politics of institutions.⁵⁴ However, in this effort they have been heavily supported by large shares of academia -- and not only conservatives -- and we may generally end on the note that the blame should be distributed over the entire system. Lip-service was paid by almost all to a fairly radical policy of autonomy in 1968. When the price was to be paid in the form of the inequities which inevitably accompany diversity and also the status uncertainty which would follow the creation of competitive institutions, few were in practice prepared to go along.

Policy Implementation in Sweden

The so-called FNYS activities concerning university governance were in no way an example of social experimentation in any strict sense. The design did not allow any "scientific" study of outcomes, and social or organizational research was only marginally involved in the evaluation effort. Rather, both policy formulation and policy evaluation were dominated by interest groups. The entire process may be seen as a continuous test of political and organizational feasibility. Had it been consciously designed as a political reform strategy -- which we doubt but do not rule out -- then it was highly successful as such. It appeased the student protesters by swift action. It abolished the professors' university without stating in definitive terms what would succeed it.

And it could do this with minimal risks since no concession was made to the demands for increased autonomy.

The dominant mode of evaluation employed -- statements by interested parties -- has left little to report by way of systematic data concerning participation. In contrast with France, students elected their representatives either in seminar groups or classes, or through their unions. A common complaint was that students showed little interest, and that those active among them were a small minority. To a large extent, this was probably true. Even more so than in France, the student body changed in Sweden in the early 1970s. One aspect of the problem was that part-time studying adults became much more common. Almost by definition they have less time and motivation to engage in university governance.

Another frequent allegation was that the reform turned university governance into a very cumbersome process. Nobody seemed entirely satisfied but very few argued in favor of a return to the pre-1969 system of governance.

The 1977 reform essentially confirmed and generalized the notion of a participatory model of governance throughout higher education. But it also modified it by introducing external representatives. And, equally significant, it aimed at increasing institutional autonomy. The reform is currently being evaluated in a quite ambitious program.⁵⁵

Slightly more than a year's experience with external representatives on the governing boards of institutions points to less dramatic effect than either proponents or opponents of this controversial proposal predicted. Conflicts over policy have reportedly occurred, but they have been rare. External representatives have been heard to complain of a lack of efficiency and a presence of favoritism within institutions, while teachers and students have countered by accusing the public representatives for not grasping the issues.

A prediction made by some commentators in the public debate seems partly to be borne out: in some cases external representatives have acted as staunch defenders of their institutions in the face of external criticism.

The effort to decentralize authority from the central to the regional and local levels contained -- as did the French reform of 1968 -- contradictory elements. An example is the amalgamation of institutions which clearly must have appeared as an instance of centralization to some people involved. The attempt at a more efficient quantitative planning is another case in point. Furthermore, the external representatives were obviously considered as a necessary guarantee that more autonomous institutions would be geared toward broader social goals.

As far as can be judged at present, the decentralization effort has been a considerable success.⁵⁶ Even if the situation is confused as to the exact competence of the various levels of the system, even many skeptics of the genuine will of the central government to decentralize seem surprised at the extent of actual decentralization. Bearing the French case in mind, we should perhaps not be entirely surprised to learn that institutions have often not used their newly acquired powers in full. The old habit of pushing the solution of conflicts up the ladder dies hard.

As in the wake of the FNYS reform, complaints are now being voiced that the reformed system of governance is too cumbersome. Undoubtedly, many difficulties have occurred during the first year of implementation. In particular, the new budgetary system -- which makes up an essential element of the decentralization effort -- proved to cause near chaotic conditions within the institutions. However, even if these and other problems turn out to be of a transitional nature we are convinced that, in Sweden as in the French case, a very large share of decision-making at the institutional level will actually consist of the

administration of participation and other new tasks (for example, the coordination of formerly separate institutions) which are not devolved responsibilities from the central level.

Policy Implementation in the United Kingdom

Locke has studied in detail the implementation process of both the Notes for Guidance of 1967 and Circular 7/70. As may be recalled the former document concerned the system of governance for the new polytechnics. Locke can in this case show

...how during the period of establishing the polytechnics from April 1967 to 1970/1 the standards which were set nationally were to change... The developments are characterized by greater precision in the DES requirements and by an increasing 'progressiveness' in terms of academic control, limitations upon LEA (local education authority) powers, devolution of responsibility, 'fair trial' for students.

While some of the variations between institutions are accounted for by these developments in thinking during the period, "there are many more which do not fit into this pattern"; they simply appear random.⁵⁷

In the case of Circular 7/70, Locke shows how several local authorities objected to the principles of the reforms. The main problems concerned finance and expenditure, but there were also objections to a greater role for teaching staff in decision-making outside their immediate concerns. The end result was, however, that

... within five years following the publication of Circular 7/70 all but a few further education colleges were operating under governing bodies with some autonomous powers, with procedures for the participation or consultation of staff and students and with procedures for staff appointments, student discipline, financial management and so forth described in articles of government approved by the Secretary of State. Their governing bodies included representatives of industry, commerce and other interests and of those working in the college as well as of the local education authority, whose representatives comprised between one-quarter and one-half of the total.

But, as with the polytechnics, there was considerable variation in the detailed provisions from college to college. Some of it can, according to Locke, be attributed to the fact that colleges have different proportions of advanced students, or that they are in different localities, but "(m)any of the variations are more elusive. They may have been a matter for local preference and possibly even of the idiosyncracies of the drafters.⁵⁸

In general Locke's analyses illustrate that the British central government was certainly less able to impose its will on institutions than were its counterparts in France and Sweden. However, it seems to be a difference of degree rather than kind. Even if the DES could not formally decide the details of the statutes of the new polytechnics -- that was the task of the local authority which owned the institution -- the fact that the Department could determine which institutions should be allowed to call themselves polytechnics (and get the privileges commensurate with that status) was a powerful tool in achieving considerable uniformity.

With regard to the British universities we have shown earlier (in Part I) the limited character of government intervention in the area of institutional governance. Still, a fairly uniform trend was established in the late 1960s towards more participatory structures. Students are represented in most major committees in most universities. However, in the United Kingdom as well, widespread apathy is reported. Peter Scott, reflecting on the period 1968-1978, has argued:⁵⁹

On the whole student participation in government has had only a limited effect on how British universities are governed. By and large they remain what they were before the student troubles of the 1960s; in some cases professorial oligarchies, in other self-governing communities of academics. So in Britain, in contrast to most other developed countries, student unrest was marginal rather than a central phenomenon of university life. 1968 marks no particular anniversary in British universities.

Even if slightly exaggerated, this characterization serves the function to contrast the United Kingdom with both France and Sweden. In other words, public policy has made a difference.

Models of Implementation

Policy making does not end once formal decisions have been taken. The implementation of a policy may be just as important to the final outcome as the initial policy idea itself. As many have argued, e.g. Majone & Wildavsky in a recent article, a "planning model" where implementation is viewed as a simple "extension of organizational design" is obviously unsatisfactory with regard to most public policies. Only a narrow and uninteresting policy is able to contain its own consequences; when "we act to implement policy, we change it". However, Majone & Wildavsky find the opposite extreme, what they term the "interaction model", equally wanting. Here implementation is seen as merely a "continuation of politics by other means". Instead of these two unsatisfactory models of the implementation process, the authors advance their own "evolutionary model". It recognizes that policy contents significantly shape implementation by, for example, defining arenas, principal actors, permissible tools and available resources. But unpredicted events, imperfect theory, and continued politics can be expected to affect implementation so as to change the initial policy idea. Consequently, implementation "will always be evolutionary; it will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out policy".⁶⁰

This conceptualization of implementation as evolution fits nicely with the policies for institutional governance examined in this article. The considerable complexity as well as their often controversial character virtually guaranteed both flaws in initial policy theories and a continuation of interest group politics during the phase of implementation.

A brief comparison of the two most comparable cases, France and Sweden, may serve to indicate the fruitfulness of the evolutionary perspective. The French university reform of 1968 was adopted with considerable fanfare and is in several respects a more radical reform with respect to autonomy and participation than its Swedish counterparts of 1969 and 1977. A reasonable hypothesis is, however, that in retrospect the two systems will eventually end up as quite similar in these regards. The implementation of policy will, in other words, be more successful in Sweden. Why? Several factors are involved but one seems to be of overriding importance, namely the level of conflict within the systems. French universities have been considerably more "politicized" than the Swedish universities. To adopt Mason's terminology, the French institutions are characterized by Tripolarity while their Swedish counterparts are instances of Triparity.⁶¹ While theoretically they provide opportunities for the same kind of institutional politics to develop, they are in practice very different in this regard. The strongly conflictual nature of French university governance has furnished the central government with its basic rationale for a conservative interpretation of the 1968 reform. Furthermore it has alienated the more moderate groups from participating in institutional governance on a regular basis.

Concluding Remarks

There are good reasons to believe that the developments we have analyzed in this paper are largely irreversible, at least in the minimal sense that a full return to the professors' university seems highly improbable. As we have tried to show the transformation of institutional governance has been linked both to the development of systems of higher education from elite to mass systems and with broad social and policy trends towards participation and

decentralization. Higher education was in this perspective only a pioneering sector.

One implication of this is that a study of problems of governance in higher education would be particularly worthwhile since they may well be precursory to future problems in other sectors; unless, of course, it could be convincingly argued that the problems have a unique character in higher education due to, for example, the specific set of tasks of that enterprise. Obviously there are such inherent features -- we based part of our argument on why the sector pioneered on this recognition -- but this fact does not prevent the sector from illustrating a number of major trade-offs to be made in other sectors as well. Such necessary trade-offs as that between participation and activities aimed at the primary goals of the enterprise (in higher education the creation and dissemination of knowledge), or that between autonomy and social equity (higher education is socially exclusive; in general goals of social equity must be imposed on institutions) take on their special flavor in higher education but are basically very general problems in political and social organization.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 For the concept of "professors' university", see Roger L. Geiger, "European Universities: The Unfinished Revolution" in Comparative Education Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1978, pp. 189-211.
- 2 Dietrich Goldschmidt, "Systems of Higher Education" in John H. Van de Graaff et. al., Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education (New York 1978), pp. 147-163; quotation from p. 159.
- 3 For an overview of such factors, see Daniel C. Levy, Universities and Governments: The Comparative Politics of Higher Education, Yale Higher Education Research Group: Working Paper 31, December 1978, esp. pp. 6-14.
- 4 See e.g. James A. Perkins, "The Future of Coordination" in Perkins (ed.), Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems (New York 1973), p. 301.
- 5 For other possible relationships, see Rune Premfors & Bertil Östergren, Systems of Higher Education: Sweden (New York 1978), chapter 6.
- 6 Arnold J. Heidenheimer et. al., Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America (New York 1975, Preface),
- 7 A remark by Nobel laureate Jacques Monod, quoted in Jürgen Schriewer, Die französischen Universitäten 1945-1968 (Bad Heilbrunn 1972), p. 113.
- 8 Graeme C. Moodie & Rowland Eustace, Power and Authority in British Universities (Edinburgh 1974), pp. 32f.
- 9 Circular 98/1946, Ministry of Education, quoted by Michael Locke, The Instruments and Articles of Government of F. E. Colleges, Coombe Lodge Report, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1976), p. 49.
- 10 Olof Ruin, Studentmakt och statsmakt (forthcoming 1979), the chapter entitled "En förvaltning i omdaning: Den nya högskolan".
- 11 Ibid.; see also Ruin, External Control and Internal Participation: Trends in the Politics and Policies of Swedish Higher Education, University of Stockholm: Group for the Study of Higher Education and Research Policy, Report No. 1, 1977, esp. pp. 21-40.
- 12 A translation of the law into English can be found in Alain Bienaymé, Systems of Higher Education: France (New York 1978), pp. 120-141. For interpretations of the law, see e.g. Charles Fourrier, Les Institutions universitaires (Paris 1971) and also Charles Debbasch, L'université désorientée: autopsie d'une mutation (Paris 1971).
- 13 John Van de Graaff, "Great Britain", in Van de Graaff et. al., Academic Power, p. 97.
- 14 Moodie & Eustace, Power and Authority in British Universities, pp. 42f.

- 15 Ibid., pp. 196-207.
- 16 See, for example, John Pratt, "The UGC Department" in Higher Education Review, Spring 1975.
- 17 Department of Education and Science, Report of the Study Group on the Government of Colleges of Education, HMSO 1966, p. 3.
- 18 Michael Locke, The Instruments and Articles of Government of Polytechnics, Coombe Lodge Report, Vo. 5, No. 15, 1972.
- 19 Already in 1968, the local authorities and the National Union of Students had, in parallel with the statement concerning the university sector, agreed that it "was just and proper that there should be effective student participation in the government and administration of all further education establishments". The document is quoted in full in John Pratt & Tyrrell Burgess, Polytechnics: A Report (Bath 1974), pp. 239-242.
- 20 Locke, The Instruments and Articles of Government of F. E. Colleges.
- 21 See, for example, the Times Higher Education Supplement, 24.2.78, "Birth of Poly Grants Committee".
- 22 The argument is largely taken from Olof Ruin's more detailed version in the Swedish context, see his Studentmakt och statsmakt.
- 23 Thomas Wolanin & Laurence Gladieux, "The Political Culture of a Policy Arena: Higher Education" in Matthew Holden & Dennis Dresang (eds), What Government Does (Beverly Hills 1975), p. 183.
- 24 A. H. Halsey & M. A. Trow, The British Academics (Cambridge 1971), esp. chapter 4 also Robert Berdahl, British Universities and State (Berkeley 1959).
- 25 For an example of this view, see e.g. Lex Donaldson, Policy and the Polytechnics (Glasgow 1975), pp. 152ff.
- 26 For this argument in the French context, see in particular Michelle Patterson, Conflict, Power and Structure: The Organization and Reform of the French University (Ph.D. diss., Yale University 1975), passim.
- 27 A closer look reveals that the Swedish national union of students (SFS) was probably instrumental in bringing about U55 at the time, and that the timing of the U68 was largely determined by a combination of pressures from the opposition parties and a new Social Democratic leadership in the Ministry of Education.
- 28 U55 may well have decided to deal with institutional governance soon after its appointment in 1955 instead of after 1960 as it chose to do. What became the 1964 reforms may well, in other words, have occurred a few years earlier.

29

One response at the national level was a voluminous but little noticed report by a parliamentary committee: Select Committee on Education and Science, Session 1968-9, Student Relations: Report and Evidence, 7 vols., 1969.

30

For a history and an interpretation of the binary policy, see Pratt & Burgess, Polytechnics: A Report, chapter 1. For the story as told by one of the chief architects, see Toby Weaver, Higher Education and the Polytechnics, The Joseph Payne Memorial Lecture, 1973-74 (Oxford 1974).

31

Rune Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in Sweden: Recent Developments (1976-1978), Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper 30, November 1978; forthcoming in European Journal of Education.

32

See, in particular, Jacques Fomerand, Policy Formulation and Change in Gaullist France: The 1968 Orientation Act of Higher Education (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1973). A summary version with the same title has been published in Comparative Politics, 8 (October 1975), pp. 59-89. For two insiders' stories consult Edgar Faure, Ce que je crois (Paris 1971) and Jacques de Chalendar, Une loi pour l'université (Paris 1970).

33

Quoted (and translated) by Fomerand, Policy Formulation and Change in Gaullist France, p. 112.

34

Weaver Report, pp. i and 1f.

35

Pratt & Burgess, Polytechnics: A Report, p. 161.

36

Maurice Kogan, Educational Policy-Making: A Study of Interest Groups and Parliament (London 1975), esp. chapter 5.

37

Fomerand, Policy Formulation and Change in Gaullist France, p. 171.

38

For the most detailed account of the first years of implementation of the 1968 Orientation Law, see the papers delivered at a conference under the auspices of the French Political Sciences Association on June 16, 1973; of in particular Isabel Boussard et al, "La genèse de la loi et son application jusqu'à l'établissement des universités" (mimeo).

39

Michelle Patterson, Conflict, Power and Structure: The Organization and Reform of the French University (Ph.D. diss., Yale University 1975).

40

Ibid., p. 220.

41

For portraits of the politicians, see Bernard Brown, "The Decision to Reform the Universities" in James Christoph & Bernard Brown, Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston 1976), and also Habiba Cohen, Elusive Reform: The French Universities, 1968-1978 (Boulder 1978), esp. pp. 78-81.

- 42 Jacques Fomerand, Policy Formulation and Change in Gaullist France: The 1968 Orientation Act of Higher Education (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York 1973), p. 231.
- 43 Isabel Boussard et. al., Les institutions universitaires française: Situation actuelle (La documentation française, 1977), pp. 47-51.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 103f.
- 45 "Vis à vis des étudiants, une méfiance qui s'est accentuée au cours des modifications apportées à la loi d'orientation. Cette méfiance s'est matérialisée par une série de mesures qui pourraient, à la limite, faire considérer les étudiants comme des électeurs mineurs". Cl. Llorens, Les Problèmes posés par les élections universitaires, (Mémoire de Doctorat, Université de Bordeaux I, 1976), p. 129.
- 46 Boussard et. al., Les institutions universitaires françaises, pp. 56-58. Cf. also Isabel Boussard, "La participation des étudiants aux élections universitaires en France" in Revue française de science politique, octobre 1974, pp. 940-965.
- 47 For example in a report by a parliamentary study group on the application of the Orientation Law: Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d'information, No. 2765 (1977), p. 15 et passim. For another example, see the interview with Alice Saunier-Seïte, minister for universities, in Le monde de l'éducation, Decembre 1978; she adds that "French individualism" is partly to blame for this low participation...
- 48 Boussard et. al., Les institutions universitaires françaises, pp. 60f. See also Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d'Information, pp. 16, 33.
- 49 For scholarly analyses which reach the same or similar conclusions, see John Van de Graaff & Dorotea Furth, "France" in Van de Graaff et al., Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education (New York 1978), pp. 49-66, and Jacques Fomerand, "The French University: What Happened After the Revolution?" in Higher Education, 6 (1977), esp. p. 113.
- 50 Le financement des universités, Rapport de la commission chargée de proposer une meilleure répartition des crédits de l'Etat, La documentation française, 1976. See also an article by the commission's chairman: Alain Bienaymé, "Allocation of Resources to Higher Education" in Barbara Burn (ed.) Access, Systems, Youth and Employment (New York 1977), pp. 73-80.
- 51 Ronald Brickman, The Limits of Reform: Power and Decentralization in the French University System (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 1972) and "Patterns of Administrative Decentralization in France: The case of University Reform" (Cornell University, n.d. but probably 1977).
- 52 For a forceful argument along that line, see Georges Vedel, "Les enseignements de l'expérience française d'autonomie et de participation" in Paedagogica Europaea, Vo. XIII, 1978-2, pp. 11-28. From a similar starting point some commentators even hold that university autonomy has decreased substantially. See e.g. François Bourricaud, La réforme universitaire en France et ses déboires, Institut d'éducation, Fondation européenne de la culture, Occasional Papers 3 (Paris 1977).

- 53 Brickman, "Patterns of Administrative Reform...", pp. 14, 29.
- 54 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
- 55 For information on the central evaluation program, consult "The UHA Programme for the Follow-Up of the Reform of Higher Education--Current Status" in the series R&D for Higher Education, 1978:3 (Stockholm: National Board of Universities and Colleges). Also Rune Premfors, The Politics of Higher Education in Sweden: Recent Developments (1976-1978), Yale Higher Education Research Group, Working Paper No. 30; forthcoming in European Journal of Education in 1979.
- 56 For a very informative recent statement, see En decentraliserad högskola: Oversyn av beslutsbefogenheter inom högskolan (Stockholm: Ministry of Education, DsU 1979:1), esp. chapter 4. The document is a report from a ministerial working party appointed to propose measures of decentralization. Significantly, very little by way of further decentralization is proposed, in spite of the considerable political pressure in that direction. The report is in fact an effective rebuttal of the view that no decentralization has occurred, a view widely held in academia.
- 57 Michael Locke, The Instruments and Articles of Government of Polytechnics, Coombe Lodge Report, Vol. 5, No. 15, 1972, pp. 42f.
- 58 Michael Locke, The Instruments and Articles of Government of F. E. Colleges, Coombe Lodge Report, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1976, pp. 80f.
- 59 Peter Scott, "British Universities 1968-1978" in Paedagogica Europaea, Vol. XIII, 197802, p. 41.
- 60 Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky, "Implementation as Evolution" in Policy Studies Review Annual, Vol. 2, 1978, ed. by Howard Freeman, pp. 103-117.
- 61 Henry L. Mason, "Shared Authority, Triparity, Tripolarity: Cross National Patterns of University Government", Polity, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Spring 1978), pp. 305-325.

INSTITUTION FOR SOCIAL AND POLICY STUDIES

The mission of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies (ISPS) is to encourage and undertake multidisciplinary research and education. The ISPS is oriented to the exploration of social problems rather than to the refinement of discipline-based methodology. In recent years, ISPS research has focused on the problems of the city, education, health service delivery, and on the modeling of social systems. Currently, research is also being developed on criminal justice, governmental reform, environment, income distribution, aging, the policy-making process, and value problems in public policy. ISPS is not a consulting organization but an instrument for enriching the social sciences and related disciplines in the University.

**Higher Education Research Group
Institution for Social and Policy Studies
1732 Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut 06520**